Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) stumbling blocks or building blocks towards multilateral trade liberalization? We address this question by investigating the e¤ects of the negotiation and implementation of PTAs on the use of antidumping (AD) (i.e., the most common form of contingent trade protection) by member countries against non-members, as there has been a concurrent surge in global AD activity and regionalism since the 1990s. Theoretically derived empirical predictions are supported by the empirical analysis based on the 15 most intense users of AD. The results demonstrate that both the negotiation and the implementation of PTAs lead to fewer AD measures against non-member countries, except for members of active customs-union agreements facing large import surges. Thus, our results highlight a building-block e¤ect of PTAs on multilateral trade cooperation when it comes to AD protection.
Introduction
The world has witnessed an astounding proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) since the early 1990s. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), as of May 2017, the number of noti…ed active PTAs stands at 274, with all WTO members being members of at least one PTA in force. 1 This …gure is in fact likely to increase in the near future as many WTO members are currently involved in negotiations for new PTAs. A second major trend that has dominated international commercial policy over the same period is the dramatic increase in antidumping (AD) activity. Although the stated objective of AD is to eliminate the injurious e¤ect of dumping (i.e., exporting a product at less than fair value), its application in practice has nothing to do with maintaining a "fair"trading environment. AD "is simply a modern form of protection"(Blonigen and Prusa, 2003) , which is nowadays used on a regular basis by a large number of developed and developing countries. 2 In this paper, we examine empirically the implications of PTAs for the AD activity of PTA members against non-member countries. This is an important endeavor for two reasons.
First, there is ongoing concern that PTAs might be "stumbling blocks"rather than "building blocks"towards multilateral trade liberalization. In this regard, given the worldwide decrease in applied tari¤ rates and the prominent role that AD plays in modern commercial policy, it is of particular importance to understand the rami…cations of PTAs for their member countries'
"external"AD activity (i.e., the AD activity of PTA members against non-members). Second, given the concurrent surge in global AD activity and regionalism, it might be tempting to interpret a simple correlation as evidence of a causal link.
To guide our empirical strategy, we rely on the theoretical work by Tabakis (2010 Tabakis ( , 2015 in order to derive testable predictions. These papers explore the implications of the (symmetric) formation of, respectively, customs unions (CUs) and free-trade areas (FTAs) for contingent protection. Both papers employ a dynamic game of trade-policy setting, in which countries are limited to cooperative multilateral agreements that are self-enforcing and the economic environment is characterized by exogenous trade-volume volatility. Restricting our attention 1 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. 2 Economists would agree that AD is justi…ed in the case of predatory dumping whose objective is to drive out domestic producers for exporters to acquire a dominant position resulting in price increases. However, predatory motives are mostly absent and they are not necessary to introduce AD measures.
to AD measures, which is the focus of our paper, three main testable predictions emerge from Tabakis (2010 Tabakis ( , 2015 : (i) the number of AD measures of members against non-members of an FTA agreement should decrease both during its negotiation and after its implementation;
(ii) the number of AD measures of members against non-members of a CU agreement should decrease during its negotiation; and (iii) the number of AD measures of members against nonmembers of a CU agreement should increase following its implementation for "high" import volumes, whereas the reverse is true for "low"volumes of imports.
To empirically test these predictions, we carry out an extensive data collection process as we gather data on six events for a large number of PTAs. In particular, we collect the dates AD activity against the rest of the world, except when members of an implemented CU agreement face substantial import growth, which is in line with the theoretical predictions of Tabakis (2010) . In brief, our results suggest that with one notable exception (i.e., CUs in force facing a substantial growth of imports), PTAs seem to be building blocks towards multilateral trade cooperation as far as AD protection is concerned.
Only three papers look (to the best of our knowledge) at the empirical e¤ects of PTAs on AD. Ahn and Shin (2011) look at the e¤ects of FTAs on the intra-FTA AD …lings of major AD users over 1995-2009, and …nd that FTAs inversely a¤ect AD investigations within the boundary of FTA membership. In comparison, Silberberger and Stender (2016) explore the impact of PTAs on the use of bilateral AD measures over the period 1991-2014, while explicitly considering the degree of intra-bloc tari¤ liberalization. They …nd that PTAs generally reduce the likelihood of AD activity among PTA members, but an improvement in the relative tari¤ treatment among fellow integration partners leads to a higher likelihood of bilateral AD activity than an equal improvement among non-integration trading partners. Finally, Prusa and Teh (2010), which is the paper closest in spirit to ours, investigate the rami…cations of PTAs for both intra-PTA AD …lings and AD …lings against non-member countries. They …nd that AD provisions in PTAs decrease the incidence of intra-PTA AD cases, but increase the number of …lings against non-PTA members. We di¤er from these papers in two major respects. First, we distinguish between the negotiation and the implementation phases of PTAs. Second, we distinguish between FTAs and CUs. As the theoretical models by Tabakis (2010, 2015) suggest and our empirical analysis veri…es, both distinctions are critical in order to get deeper insights into the rami…cations of PTAs for AD protection.
Our paper is also naturally related to the (empirical) literature on whether PTAs are building blocks or stumbling blocks towards multilateral tari¤ liberalization. Some studies provide evidence in support of a building-block e¤ect of PTAs (e.g., Estevadeordal et al., 2008) , whereas others o¤er evidence showing that PTAs are stumbling blocks towards tari¤ liberalization at the multilateral level (e.g., Limão, 2006; Karacaovali and Limão, 2008) . Our work clearly complements these papers. Moreover, it demonstrates that in order to get a more thorough picture regarding the implications of regionalism for the multilateral trading system, other policy instruments besides most-favored-nation tari¤s should be taken into consideration.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a non-technical presentation of the theoretical framework that can be used to model the issues under investigation. The empirical predictions that follow from this framework and how they can be econometrically tested are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 is dedicated to the description of the data, with an emphasis on the extensive data collection undertaken to systematically record the various phases (i.e., initiation of process, launch of negotiations, conclusion of negotiations, signature, rati…cation, and entry into force) of a PTA. The empirical results are discussed in Section 5, together with a quanti…cation of their implications on the use of AD and several robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
As we discussed in the introduction, our main goal in this paper is to empirically examine the impact of PTAs on their members'"external" AD activity (i.e., the AD activity of PTA members against non-member countries). To this end, we rely on the theoretical work by Tabakis (2010 Tabakis ( , 2015 to derive testable predictions. Tabakis (2010) looks at the rami…cations of symmetric CU formation for multilateral trade cooperation, while the companion paper, Tabakis (2015) , focuses on FTAs. The analysis in both papers rests on two main assumptions, which are common in the literature on trade agreements. First, countries are limited to self-enforcing multilateral agreements, i.e., agreements that balance for each country its shortterm terms-of-trade gains from defection from the agreed-upon policies against the long-term welfare losses due to its trading partners' retaliation. 3 Second, the economic environment is characterized by exogenous trade-volume volatility. As a result, "special" protection (or contingent protection-the two terms will be used interchangeably below) becomes an indispensable on-equilibrium-path safety valve, allowing countries to maintain multilateral cooperation amid volatile trade swings. More speci…cally, a trade agreement should allow countries to temporarily raise their cooperative level of protection-via using special protection-when facing signi…cant import-volume surges so that their incentive to defect is kept in check and multilateral cooperation does not break down. 4 Tabakis (2010) demonstrates, in the context of a competing-importers model, that the parallel initiation of di¤erent CU negotiations leads to an easing of multilateral trade tensions, especially with respect to the employment of special protection. Intuitively, this stems from the market-power e¤ect of CU establishment due to the harmonization of the member countries' external trade policies. In particular, a CU, relative to any of its member states taken individually, enjoys more substantial market power (i.e., a greater ability to a¤ect world prices) and can, therefore, credibly threaten to punish more harshly any deviation from the cooperative course. 5 As a result, as countries enter (symmetrically) into CU talks and the 3 See Bagwell and Staiger (2002) for an in-depth analysis of enforcement issues within the context of GATT/WTO. 4 See the seminal work by Bagwell and Staiger (1990) for further elaboration on this result. Bown and Crowley (2013) provide empirical evidence in support of this theoretical prediction. 5 For empirical evidence that terms-of-trade or market-power considerations do play a signi…cant role in trade policy formulation, see Broda et al. (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2011) . establishment of di¤erent CUs becomes (more) likely, the expected discounted value of future multilateral cooperation increases. At the same time, countries'static incentive to defect from the cooperative agreement remains una¤ected as it is only a function of current trade patterns, upon which the mere initiation of CU talks has no e¤ect. Thus, in comparison with the pre-CU-negotiations period, a more liberal multilateral trading environment is now feasible as countries are less inclined to violate multilateral cooperation and revert to protectionist stances.
This bene…cial e¤ect of CU formation on multilateral cooperation is, however, temporary. 6 Once the negotiations are over and the CU agreements come into force, countries'static incentive to deviate from the cooperative path also intensi…es, and thereby, a more protectionist trading environment resurfaces. The reason is that the CUs can more e¤ectively manipulate the terms of trade to their advantage than can any of their member countries when viewed in isolation. An important …nding that emerges from the analysis of Tabakis (2010) is that in comparison with the pre-CU world (i.e., a world where there are no CU negotiations in the near horizon), the employment of contingent protection in the post-CU world is more severe for "high"import volumes, but is less frequent overall in the sense that a higher import-volume surge is required to warrant its use (on the equilibrium path).
These theoretical results are illustrated in Figure 1 , which depicts the most cooperative level of protection ( b c ) than can be sustained multilaterally (i.e., between countries not part of the same CU) as a function of the import volume. Notice that e refers to the common trade shock encountered by all countries in a given period, while e refers to the critical tradeshock threshold (or, equivalently, import-volume threshold) above which the employment of contingent protection becomes necessary so that multilateral cooperation does not break down. Considering the various phases the countries'trading relationship passes through, b c 1 represents the (most cooperative) equilibrium trade-protection function in the pre-CU world, while b c 2 refers to the corresponding one during the CU-negotiations phase. As b c 2 is to the right of and parallel to the original curve, this implies that above the threshold e 1 , the same level of imports will induce lower protectionist pressures (i.e., fewer AD measures) once countries 6 It is in fact maximized as the successful conclusion of the CU talks and the ensuing implementation of the CU agreements draw near. enter into CU talks. However, once the di¤erent CUs are implemented, the b c curve shifts to the left and becomes steeper (see b c
3 ). Therefore, as compared with the pre-CU world, less (more) protectionist trade policies will be implemented at the multilateral level in the post-CU world for low (high) import volumes.
In his follow-up paper, Tabakis (2015) explores the implications of FTA agreements for special protection in the context of a model similar to the aforementioned one. He shows that the parallel formation of di¤erent FTAs leads to a gradual but permanent easing of trade tensions at the multilateral level, especially regarding the use of special-protection instruments.
The intuition underlying this …nding is straightforward. The FTA agreements induce trade diversion, lowering the volume of trade between FTA partners and non-partner countries.
This has a dampening e¤ect on countries' static incentive to defect from the cooperative course, allowing for a less protectionist international trading environment to come forth. In fact, a relatively liberal environment can be maintained also during the FTA negotiations, as the prospective emergence of di¤erent FTAs with the accompanying reduction in multilateral trade barriers raises the expected discounted value of future cooperation, while leaving the short-term terms-of-trade gains from increased protection una¤ected.
Again, these theoretical results can be illustrated in a way similar to the CU case. Figure   2 shows such a representation where the b c curves can be read in the same way as in Figure   1 . As in the CU scenario, b c 2 lies to the right of b c 1 , but b c 3 is now farther to the right and ‡atter than both b c 1 and b c 2 . Thus, there is a gradual but continuous easing of protectionist pressures as countries negotiate and then implement di¤erent FTA agreements. Actually, once the FTAs are established, the decrease in protectionism multilaterally will be even larger as compared with the corresponding e¤ect of the launch of FTA negotiations.
Empirical Predictions and Methodology
The theoretical framework described in the previous section leads to a number of testable predictions regarding the interaction between the negotiation and implementation of PTAs and the use of contingent trade instruments. Among those that qualify as such, AD measures are the ones that are being used the most extensively around the world thanks to their ‡exibility: they are relatively easy to administer, and a case for their introduction is not that di¢ cult to meet the necessary legal conditions. Countervailing duties and safeguards also fall in this category, but they are not used as extensively because of the more stringent conditions that must be ful…lled. For example, Bown and Crowley (2016, Table 5 ) report several statistics related to the share of a country's imports covered by di¤erent contingent measures over the period 1995-2013. Their statistics demonstrate that AD is the favoured instrument and when countervailing duties and safeguards are used, they often cover the same products also targeted by AD. It is only for China, the EU, Turkey, and the United States that other instruments have had a meaningful impact on trade, but even in these cases, only in some short time periods (see Table 5 and Figure In order to assess these predictions, we proceed in two steps. First, we evaluate whether the negotiation and implementation of PTAs a¤ect the introduction of AD measures by PTA members against non-member countries, without distinguishing between FTAs and CUs. This serves as a preliminary stage to understand whether there is any prima facie evidence in the data of the e¤ects that should manifest as a result of the establishment of PTAs. Notice that a lack of evidence on the e¤ect of PTA implementation on AD may be due to the somewhat opposite e¤ects that FTAs and CUs may display (as a function of the import volume), while there should be a clear e¤ect of PTA negotiation on AD employment since the negotiation of both FTAs and CUs should lead to fewer AD measures against non-negotiating countries. In the second step, the three predictions are individually tested by considering the di¤erential e¤ects when FTAs and CUs are implemented, also allowing for an interaction e¤ect between the two types of PTAs and the change in the volume of imports.
In both steps, the dependent variable (AD i;j;t ) is the count of new AD measures that country i imposes against country j in year t. Given that the dependent variable is a nonnegative integer, we employ a negative binomial estimator for all of our regressions. 7 The basic speci…cation we estimate in the …rst step is AD i;j;t = 1 P T As negotiation i;z;t + 2 P T As implemented i;z;t +
where P T As negotiation i;z;t and P T As implemented i;z;t are our regressors of interest. P T As negotiation i;z;t is the count of PTAs that country i is negotiating with any country z 6 = j at time t, with P T As implemented i;z;t counting the number of PTAs that are implemented (i.e., in force) between countries i and z 6 = j in year t (out of those that have entered into force during the sample period). Notice that the relevant aspect of these variables is that they measure the involvement of country i in PTAs not featuring the trade partner j, as the focus of our analysis is on the e¤ect of PTAs on AD use between members and nonmember countries. In some speci…cations, we also control for the level of bilateral imports and their growth (X i;j;t s ) and the macro conditions-real exchange rate and GDP growthof importing country i (Z i;t s ) and exporting country j (W j;t s ). 8 Year …xed e¤ects (i.e., t )
are always included, while separate importer and exporter …xed e¤ects (i.e., i and j ) or country-pair (i.e., dyad) …xed e¤ects are included in di¤erent speci…cations.
In the second step of the econometric analysis, we distinguish the e¤ect of negotiation and implementation of PTAs depending on whether we consider FTAs or CUs. Thus, our key regressors will be four: F T As negotiation i;z;t , F T As implemented i;z;t , CU s negotiation i;z;t , CU s implemented i;z;t . Furthermore, the speci…cation must account for the di¤erential e¤ect of FTA versus CU implementation as a function of the import volume. Thus, the implementation regressors need to be interacted with Import growth t=t 1 to verify whether the data con…rm that external AD measures may actually become more likely as a result of the enforcement of a CU agreement and a surge of imports. 7 Compared to the poisson estimator that assumes that the mean and the variance of the dependent variable are the same, the negative binomial allows for overdispersion (i.e., larger variance), which is what we observe in our data. 8 The subscript s indicates alternative lags of the regressors.
The possible e¤ects of PTA negotiation and implementation on their members'external AD activity are identi…ed through di¤erent variation in the data, depending on whether importer and exporter or dyad …xed e¤ects are used. The use of country-pair …xed e¤ects makes for the most demanding speci…cation, as any time-invariant country-pair heterogeneity is absorbed by the …xed e¤ect and any signi…cance of the coe¢ cients of interest (i.e., 1 and 2 ) is derived by variation within the country pair due to di¤erent PTAs in which the importing country is involved over time (in terms of negotiations and implementations). If this is the cleanest form of identi…cation in that it account for any unobservable (non time-varying) country-pair determinant, the non-linear nature of the estimator forces us to drop any country pair in which no single AD measure has ever been introduced by the importing country against the trade partner in question during the sample period. Some of these country pairs should be dropped from the estimation because they are such that AD measures are highly unlikely (e.g., very small exporting country or high inter-industry trade ‡ows). However, country pairs may be excluded when a zero for AD measures is a "true" zero: it happens to be zero but AD measures could have occurred. The use of separate importer and export …xed e¤ects provides an alternative identi…cation strategy, which does not exclude these observations. In this case, only importing countries that have used AD at some point during the sample (against any trade partner) are included but this is not a limitation since we do want to restrict the analysis to active and intense users of AD.
When including dyad …xed e¤ects, these e¤ects are estimated instead of relying on a conditional …xed-e¤ects estimator. In the latter case, a conditional likelihood function is used so that the e¤ects are "conditioned out" of the likelihood function and do not need to be estimated. Thus, this estimator is not equivalent to what is usually thought of as a …xed-e¤ects estimator (i.e., there are no di¤erent intercepts). In fact, the coe¢ cients of timeinvariant variables could still be included and identi…ed in conditional …xed-e¤ects estimations.
The inclusion and estimation of dyad …xed e¤ects may give rise to inconsistent estimates due to the incidental parameter problem in samples with short panels. However, Allison and Waterman (2002) demonstrate that no such bias emerges.
Before moving to discussing the data and the results, a few observations are in order.
First of all, our key regressors (i.e., P T As negotiation i;z;t and P T As implemented i;z;t ) only take into consideration PTAs that a¤ect a minimum level of imports in the year before entry into force, or if not yet in force, in the year before initiation of the negotiations. In fact, we can reasonably expect that the mechanisms discussed in Section 2 are at play only if a PTA a¤ects a signi…cant amount of trade, else the trade-diversion and market-power e¤ects would not manifest themselves. Theory is silent on what "signi…cant"actually means in practice. In the benchmark regressions, we assume this threshold to be 10%, but we discuss the sensitivity of our results to lower thresholds in the robustness section. 9 In terms of the sample, we do not include country pairs that are involved in the negotiation or the enforcement of PTAs. In fact, our focus is on verifying whether PTAs have an e¤ect on the use of contingent (i.e., AD) measures between member and non-member countries depending on how the status of PTAs varies over time. Our empirical predictions focus on a comparison of AD patterns before and after the negotiations and implementations of PTAs, not a comparison of AD patterns within the PTAs vis-à-vis the AD patterns between member and non-member countries (although we revisit this choice in the section on robustness checks). 10 
Data
In order to implement the econometric strategy discussed in the previous section, three sets of data are needed. Comprehensive details on the various phases of PTAs is the …rst building block and the one that proves the most di¢ cult to collect. Data on the use of AD is the second building block, while trade and macro variables constitute the …nal set of data. In the following, we discuss each of these datasets in turn.
Regarding PTAs, our full sample includes all trade agreements noti…ed to the GATT/WTO that satisfy all of the following three conditions: (i) they have entered into force from 1980 onwards and are still active, or they are not yet in force but their negotiation has been announced "early" to the WTO; (ii) they involve at least one of the 15 most intense users of AD (to be de…ned below); and (iii) for their member countries identi…ed by condition (ii), the intra-PTA import share is at least 0:2%. For these PTAs, we then carry out an extensive data collection process as we gather for each of them the dates of the following events: (i) initiation of process (e.g., the launching of a joint feasibility study or the expression of intention Using 10% as the minimum share of imports a¤ected by a PTA to choose which agreements to include for the empirical analysis, we end up using 24 PTAs for the construction of P T As negotiation i;z;t and P T As implemented i;z;t (see Table A1 in the Appendix for the full list).
Out of these 24 PTAs, 4 are still in the negotiation phase at the end of the sample (i.e., end of 2015) and only 4 are CUs. As we know, most PTAs take the form of FTAs, which may make it more di¢ cult to identify the e¤ects that theory suggests CUs should have. However, it is also important to notice that one given PTA may be counted for more than one of the importing countries included in the analysis. For example, NAFTA is counted for all three member countries while the CU between the EU and Turkey is counted only for Turkey, as EU imports from Turkey in 1995 (i.e., the year before entry into force) represent less that 10% of the EU's total imports.
Data on the worldwide usage of AD (since 1980) comes mainly from the Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2015) and are complemented by the data from Moore and Zanardi (2009) for some countries and years. 11 In particular, these sources allow us to construct the dependent variable, AD i;j;t , as the count of the AD measures that an importer i has introduced against an exporter j in a year t. Since we would expect an e¤ect of PTAs on the use of AD to occur only for those countries that do make systematic use of this form of contingent protection, we limit the sample of importing countries to intense users of the AD system. of AD over our sample period, which runs from 1980 until 2015 with a later starting year if an importing country has implemented an AD law more recently or AD data are not available (see Table A2 in the Appendix for details of included years by country). In order to select the countries to include in our analysis, we consider the cumulative number and annual average of their AD investigations and applied measures (e.g., duties, price undertakings).
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The summary statistics reported in Table 1 con…rm previous …nding of the literature in terms of the countries that are most intense users of this instrument. Thus, we include the usual …ve traditional users (i.e., Australia, Canada, the EU, New Zealand, and the United States) and the ten most active new users: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey. We include New Zealand because it was an active user in the 1980s (which are included in our analysis) although its number of initiations and measures per year are not very large, and in a robustness check, we exclude New Zealand. Finally, macro controls as (the log of) bilateral real exchange rate and importer and exporter GDP growth rates (between t and t 3) are included as they have been shown to a¤ect the introduction of AD measures (e.g., see the seminal work by Knetter and Prusa, 2003) .
These variables are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
Merging these three sets of data, the sample consists of 15 importing countries and all of their trade partners over the sample period 1980-2015. Notice though that starting from the 12 Initiations and measures per year are based on the number of years for which a country has had an AD law during the sample period 1980-2015. 13 We do not include Taiwan in our sample even if it has initiated several investigations because of its very low success rate for the introduction of measures (i.e., 23:4% versus 56:1% for the entire set of AD users and 57:1% for the chosen 15 importers), which we use as dependent variable.
consideration of all potential trade partners of the 15 importing countries identi…ed above, import and macro data are missing for many observations, and therefore, their inclusion forces us to drop many observations.
Empirical Results
The results of the …rst step of our estimation strategy are presented in Table 2 . In this case, we do not distinguish between FTAs and CUs in their e¤ects on the use of AD against third countries. Still, it should be the case that higher values of P T As negotiation i;z;t lead to fewer external AD measures (i.e., the e¤ects of FTAs and CUs during their negotiation is the same).
The estimated coe¢ cient for P T As implemented i;z;t should be negative, except if the e¤ect from members of CUs facing high import growth dominates. Table 2 includes eight speci…cations that di¤er because of …xed e¤ects, of whether control variables are included or not, and depending on the functional form of P T As negotiation i;z;t and P T As implemented i;z;t (in logs in the last four columns). Even before discussing the di¤erences of these modeling strategies, it is obvious that the results are quite robust: the negotiation and implementation of PTAs between an importing country i and third countries z 6 = j (in year t) reduces the number of AD measures that country i imposes against trading partner j (in year t). All but one of the coe¢ cients are statically signi…cant at the 1% level and they are larger (in absolute terms) for implemented PTAs than for PTAs under negotiation. Thus, it is the case that the data provide broad support for the theoretical predictions discussed in Section 2, . In graphical terms, the negative coe¢ cients for P T As negotiation i;z;t represent the downward shift in the b c 2 curves in Figures 1 and 2 , as the expected value of future cooperation increases and the static incentive to defect does not change. Regarding the coe¢ cients for P T As implemented i;z;t , Figures 1 and 2 highlight an important di¤erence between FTAs and CUs that we will address in the following table.
Looking in detail at the results in Table 2 , the …rst speci…cation includes only year, importer and exporter …xed e¤ects together with the key regressors of interest. It is clearly the case that this minimalist version should be augmented by the trade and macro controls that the literature shows to be important determinants of AD activity. Although their inclusion in column (2) forces us to drop many observations due to missing data, it is reassuring to see that reducing the sample size has minimal e¤ects on the estimated coe¢ cients. These control variables do display the role that we expect from previous …ndings: the estimated coe¢ cients for import volumes and import growth are positive (although the latter e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant), as is the case for an appreciation of the real exchange rate of the importing country (while GDP growth rates do not display a signi…cant role). Columns (3) and (4) are analogous but they are based on dyad …xed e¤ects. This strategy imposes a loss of observations also for the minimalist speci…cation (i.e., any country pair without a single AD measure over the sample is dropped), implying a smaller di¤erence of observations when the controls are included. Still, the results are very similar to the previous ones: there are no signi…cant di¤erences between the estimates in columns (2) and (4).
The last remaining four columns re-estimate the same speci…cations with the key regressors of the count of PTA negotiations and implementations replaced by the log of one plus these count variables. This alternative formulation imposes a non-linear e¤ect of PTA negotiation and implementation and the results con…rm this to be the case. Again, the reduced samples due to the inclusion of control variables do not change the conclusions.
The purpose of Table 2 was to establish prima facie evidence supporting the theoretical predictions of Tabakis (2010 Tabakis ( , 2015 and dispel any concern of sample selection due to the availability of trade and macro controls. This second aspect is crucial as we move to the second step where the role of import growth is essential to test the empirical predictions in all of their details. The results of the second step are reported in Table 3 , which does not include any minimalist speci…cation since import growth is more than just a control variable and cannot be excluded. Columns (1) and (3) employ year, importer and exporter …xed e¤ects, while columns (2) and (4) use year and dyad …xed e¤ects. As for the functional form of the count of PTAs, in the last two columns we use their log counterparts.
In terms of negotiations, it is con…rmed that they lead to fewer external AD measures with a stronger (in terms of signi…cance and magnitude) dampening e¤ect for CUs. Considering the implementation of trade agreements, FTAs have a negative sign which is not a¤ected by the size of the import surge. Implementation of CUs has an overall negative e¤ect but the interaction terms with import growth are positive and signi…cant, indicating that for large enough trade surges, the market-power e¤ect of CUs can dominate and lead to more AD measures. This is in line with the empirical predictions derived from Tabakis (2010) and in particular, with the positioning and the slope of the b c 3 curve in Figure 1 . As for the other regressors, their signi…cance is very much in line with the results of Table 2. Notice that some of the results are imprecisely estimated when using the log formulations in the last two columns. As a matter of fact, there may not be enough variation to uncover a non-linear e¤ect of the implementation of CUs, given that most of our PTAs take the form of FTAs (see Table   A1 in the Appendix).
In conclusion, the estimates of Tables 2 and 3 
Quanti…cation of E¤ects
Given the non-linear nature of the estimator, the estimated coe¢ cients do not allow for a quanti…able interpretation of the role of our key regressors on AD patterns. To facilitate such an analysis, we report in Tables 4 and 5 the predicted counts of AD measures based on our estimations, focusing on the speci…cations including dyad …xed e¤ects, which are the most demanding in identifying the rami…cations of PTAs for AD.
For the speci…cations in columns (4) and (8) of Table 2, Table 4 reports the predicted counts of AD measures when there are no negotiations and implementations of PTAs or when there is one of each (separately or jointly).
14 Clearly, AD is a relatively rare phenomenon even when restricting the sample to country pairs in which there is at least one AD measure in the sample period (i.e., when including dyad …xed e¤ects): the estimates predict fewer than 1 AD measure when there is no PTA under negotiation or in force (i.e., 0:469 or 0:440, depending on the speci…cation). The relevant comparison, though, is what happens to these country pairs when there is negotiation and/or implementation of a PTA. In both cases, the predicted counts drop signi…cantly: based on column (1), one PTA under negotiation (implemented) reduces the count of AD measures by 25% (34%), with an overall reduction of 50% for importing countries simultaneously implementing and negotiating PTAs. 15 The magnitudes in column (2), based on the speci…cation with the log version of our main regressors, are quite similar in size (i.e., 23%, 34%, and 48%, respectively), con…rming that such speci…cations are consistent with our benchmark results. 16 These changes are quite large, but we must keep in mind that they are based on PTAs that a¤ect at least 10% of the import volume of the importing country. Table 5 reports similar calculations for columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 where we distinguish between FTAs and CUs and we include interactions with import growth. As a result, Table 5 is more cumbersome to read as the e¤ect of implemented FTAs or CUs must be de…ned for di¤erent values of the import growth. Still, the picture that emerges from Table 5 is qualitatively similar to the one from Table 4 to the role of CUs: implemented CUs have milder or null dampening e¤ects when import 15 The estimated counts within each column of Table 4 are statistically di¤erent from each other except for the second and third count of each speci…cation. 16 The two speci…cations would give rise to more signi…cantly di¤erent counts if we were to consider more than one negotiation or implementation of PTAs, as in this case the non-linear log formulation would play a bigger role.
growth is assumed to be at the 75 th percentile. Furthermore, import growth can completely o¤set the dampening e¤ect of negotiating a CU: the predicted counts with no negotiation or implementation are not statistically di¤erent than when a CU is under negotiation and the importing country is experience high import growth (i.e., 0:359 is not statistically di¤erent from 0:287 but it is di¤erent from 0:249). The estimated counts in column (2) provide a very similar picture. Tables 2 and 3 The choice of this threshold is based on the interest to consider PTAs that can be expected to have meaningful trade e¤ects. Still, this threshold is simply assumed and we need to verify whether the results are sensitive to this assumption.
Robustness Checks
Thus, we re-estimate our speci…cations using a threshold of 5%. In such case, we would expect the results to become weaker and probably less statistically signi…cant as "smaller"
PTAs are now included. 17 Table 6 presents the results of such an exercise, only reporting estimates based on the use of dyad …xed e¤ects, as they lead to the most demanding of the speci…cations. The …rst two columns parallel Table 2 with the second column employing the log version of the PTA count variables; the remaining two columns mirror Table 3 , again with the linear and non-linear formulation of the key regressors. Overall, the results are very much in line with our previous conclusions although they sometimes present smaller coe¢ cients (in absolute terms) and/or lower levels of signi…cance for our main regressors of interest (while the coe¢ cients for the other variables do not present any signi…cant change). The only signi…cant change is that the coe¢ cient for F T As negotiation i;z;t is not signi…cant even in the linear 17 With a 5% threshold, 12 more PTAs, of which one CU, are used to compute our main regressors of interest.
version.
A di¤erent way to measure the importance of PTAs is to use as regressors the share of trade a¤ected by negotiations and implementations. In this case, we would not have to choose a threshold. However, this exercise comes with its own complications. On a methodological front, we may be concerned that such shares are endogenous to the use of AD. On a conceptual front, enlargements of the EU create problems since we consider the EU as a 'country'and don't count its internal trade, which poses problems for the calculation of trade shares once the negotiation of an enlargement is implemented. For these reasons, such an exercise proves problematic. Still, if we were to ignore the endogeneity problem and drop the EU from the sample of importing countries, the results would be qualitatively in line with what we have presented so far: the higher the share of trade involved in the negotiation and implementation of PTAs with third country and the fewer AD measures an importing country would introduce.
18
In another methodological check, we re-estimate our results without excluding the country pairs negotiating or enforcing a PTA. At the end of Section 3, we argued that these observations should be excluded since the theoretical models by Tabakis (2010 Tabakis ( , 2015 only lead to empirical predictions on the pattern of AD between member and non-member countries of a PTA. Still, we can include the observations so far discarded although we are agnostic on how negotiations and implementations of PTAs a¤ects the parties in the PTAs. Table 7 proposes the same type of speci…cations as in Table 6 with these extra observations (almost 3; 000) and dummy variables that control for country pairs that are PTA members (P T A dummy i;j;t ) or are negotiating a PTA (N egotiation dummy i;j;t ). The results show that the conclusions we reached earlier are overall still valid (although somewhat weaker for the negotiation of FTAs and implementation of CUs). These estimations con…rm earlier results found in the literature that members of a PTA introduce fewer AD measures against each other. Instead the estimates for the N egotiation dummy i;j;t are never signi…cant.
We can also experiment by changing the set of countries included in the analysis. 19 First, we drop New Zealand as it was a heavy user of AD in the 1980s, but has ever since dramatically decreased the use of AD measures. Excluding it as an importer does not a¤ect any of our qualitative conclusions. Considering the predominant role that India and China are playing recently when it comes to AD, it is reassuring that the results are qualitatively unchanged when we drop them from the list of importing countries.
In a …nal methodological check (not reported to save on space), we drop our year …xed e¤ects and replace our importer or dyad …xed e¤ects with the interaction of such …xed e¤ects and a trend (i.e., we allow for importer and dyad-speci…c …xed e¤ects). Such a change would address the concern that countries have become more open to trade over time, translating in both an increase in the negotiation and implementation of PTAs and a reduction in the use of AD. Once again, our qualitative results are unchanged by the use of these di¤erent …xed e¤ects.
Conclusions
This paper has explored the implications of PTAs for their member countries' external AD actions (i.e., the AD measures of members against non-member countries). We have relied (4) and (8) of Table 2 conditioning on the variables in the C(•) function (in Table 4 ) taking on the specified values while the other variables are taking their actual values. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: The dependent variable is the count of AD measures introduced by country i against country j in year t. PTAs are included in the regressors if they affect at least 5% of the import value of the importing country. The table reports the estimated coefficients of negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered at country-pair level; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: The dependent variable is the count of AD measures introduced by country i against country j in year t. PTAs are included in the regressors if they affect at least 10% of the import value of the importing country. The table reports the estimated coefficients of negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered at country-pair level; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
